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Adverse Selection in Annuity Markets:





We study adverse selection using data from an 1808 Act of British
Parliament that effectively opened a market for life annuities. Our
analysis indicates significant selection effects. The evidence for ad-
verse selection is strongest for a sub-sample of annuitants whose an-
nuities were purchased by profit-seeking speculators, a sub-sample in
which “advantageous selection” resulting from multi-dimensional het-
erogeneity is unlikely to have been significant. These results support
the view that adverse selection can be masked by advantageous se-
lection in empirical studies of standard insurance markets. JEL N23
D82.
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1 Introduction
In 1808, Britain’s Parliament passed the Life Annuity Act, effectively opening
a market for government-provided life annuities. The unique features of the
Act provide an unusual opportunity to explore the empirical relevance of
adverse selection.
Adverse selection has played an important role in economic theory since
the seminal works of Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973), and others. Studying
its empirical importance has proved challenging in several respects. First,
as emphasized by Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000), it is difficult to distinguish
empirically between moral hazard and adverse selection.
Second, researchers are unlikely to observe information hidden from in-
surers; this has motivated tests based on the correlation between insurance
choices and ex-post risk, conditional on insurer-observed information. But
these tests are still empirically problematic since econometricians often lack
access to insurer-observed information.
Third, the existing empirical evidence for even the most theoretically ro-
bust consequences of informational asymmetries is surprisingly weak. For
example, Cawley and Phillipson (1999) find no evidence of selection in life
insurance markets, Cardon and Hendel (2001) find no evidence in health in-
surance markets, and Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001)
find no evidence in auto insurance markets (in contrast to Pueltz and Snow
(1994)). This absence of evidence may be due to insurance providers’ coun-
tervailing informational advantages (Villeneuve, 2003) or else to a fourth
empirical challenge: the confounding effects of “advantageous selection” re-
sulting from, e.g., heterogeneity in risk aversion (DeMeza and Webb (2001),
Cohen and Einav (2007), and Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)).
Annuity markets are a particularly interesting setting for studying infor-
mational asymmetries, not least because many of these challenges are less
problematic. Moral hazard is plausibly negligible in annuity markets, and,
since annuity providers typically do relatively little risk-classification, it is
comparatively easy for researchers to observe the entire set of information
employed by insurers in writing policies. Furthermore, highly risk averse in-
dividuals are likely both to be longer lived and to find longevity insurance
more intrinsically appealing. Heterogeneity in risk aversion can thus be ex-
pected to reinforce rather than to mask the longevity-enhancing effects of
adverse selection in annuity markets (Cutler et al. (2008)).
Finkelstein and Poterba’s (2002, 2004, 2006) studies of annuity markets
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have yielded some of the strongest empirical evidence of adverse selection,
likely in part for these reasons. Unfortunately, the applicability and gener-
ality of their evidence is limited in at least two ways. First, it comes from a
market where annuitization is mandatory. The substantial literature docu-
menting a puzzling dearth of voluntary annuitization (Mitchell et al. (1999);
Davidoff et al. (2005)) suggests caution in extrapolating from this evidence.
Second, although advantageous selection due to heterogeneity in risk aver-
sion is likely to reinforce rather than obscure adverse selection in annuity
markets, the possibility of confounding advantageous selection arising from
other dimensions of heterogeneity nevertheless remains a concern.
This paper uses the 1808 Act to provide a novel empirical look at adverse
selection in the purely voluntary annuity market it effectively opened. We
first provide evidence of adverse selection by showing that the annuitants
were longer lived than age- and gender-specific population mortality tables
would have suggested. Since annuity pricing under this Act varied only by age
and gender, our evidence indicates selection relative to the risk-classification
scheme employed by the U.K. government. We also document additional
selection in response to an 1829 price increase designed to account for the
enhanced longevity of early annuitants.
The most novel contribution of this paper stems from an odd feature
of the 1808 Act that permitted “speculators” to purchase annuities on the
lives of others. Selection by profit-seeking speculators was presumably based
exclusively on longevity, thus mitigating concerns about the confounding
effects of advantageous selection. In Section 5, we document that adverse
selection was strongest among these speculator nominated annuitants. This
supports the view that advantageous selection can significantly mask the
empirical importance of adverse selection in standard insurance markets.
We describe the 1808 Life Annuity Act and its subsequent evolution in
Section 2. Section 3 describes the available data, which are in an awk-
wardly condensed form that renders standard survival-curve analysis impos-
sible. Section 4 presents some suggestive graphical evidence using “synthetic”
survival curves and then develops a formal statistical test that we use in Sec-
tion 5 to present our main results. Details of the formal test are contained
in a brief technical appendix. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The 1808 Act
Prior to the Life Annuity Act of 1808, British government debt consisted
almost exclusively of Consols—coupon bonds with infinite maturity. The
explicit goal of the Act was to replace them with finite-lived debt by allow-
ing individuals to exchange Consols for life annuities.1 Since Consols were
tradable assets, the act effectively opened a life-annuity market.
Annuities sold under this act made twice-yearly tax-exempt payments.
The size of these payments depended on the interest rate (the market Consol
price) and the age of the annuitant (henceforth: the nominee). Prices were
designed to be actuarially fair; to that end, they were priced to be 2% more
expensive than the actuarially fair price implied by the Northampton life
table. This table, first published by Richard Price in 1771,2 was based on
the mortality experience of all residents of the town of Northampton and was
in wide use by life assurance companies (Francis, 1853).
Nominees had to be at least 35 years of age, and annuity yields were
capped at age 75, strongly discouraging purchases by older annuitants. A
minister- or magistrate-certified register of birth or baptism was required for
age verification. Similarly, verification of non-decease was required for receipt
of each payment. Finally, the Act allowed individuals to “speculate on lives”
by purchasing and owning annuities contingent on the lives of others. The
nominee was required to be from Britain or Ireland for these purchases.
Shortly after passage of the Act, there appears to have been a recognition
that the use of the Northampton tables was leading to large government
losses. Murphy (1939) writes that it “was wholly unsuitable as a measure of
the lower rates of mortality experienced by a self-selected group of annuitants.
It was not long before this shortcoming was brought to the attention of the
Exchequer.” In contrast, Francis (1853) suggests that self-selection may have
been a minor concern relative to speculation. He writes: “The speculators
1There may well have been more subtle motivations leading to its passage. Spencer
Perseval, addressing Parliament in 1808 (viz Hendriks, 1856), argued that the Act would
allow the government to retire debt at favorable interest rates without causing interest
rates to rise—an argument Murphy ridicules as indicating Perseval’s desire to “have his
cake and eat it too” (Murphy, 1939, page 6) but which is plausible if the government
believed it could extract surplus by filling a missing market. Alternatively, there could
have been a political desire to align the interests of the retired monied classes with the
government by providing them with a valued service—as argued by Weir (1989) for the
French government-issued Tontines of the 18th century.
2We transcribed the tables from a republished version in Baily (1813).
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soon found out that the Government charge for a life annuity afforded a very
remunerative investment, and the insurance offices made considerable profits
by purchasing and re-selling them ... The mistake made by the Government
in its calculations was no secret.”
In 1823, Parliament finally took active steps to address this perceived mis-
pricing by commissioning John Finlaison to study the mortality experience of
the early nominees.3 His 1829 report developed a new set of gender-specific
life tables (henceforth the “Finlaison tables”) based on the observed mortal-
ity experience of these nominees. After some debate and a brief suspension
of the life annuity program, Parliament determined to resume it with gender-
specific pricing based on these new tables.
This re-pricing made annuities significantly more expensive: using pricing
in Hendriks (1856) and a 3.75% interest rate, we calculate, for example, that
periodic payments fell by 4.4% and 17% for sixty year old males and females.
Since the re-pricing was based on the longevity of the early annuitants and
was designed to be actuarially fair, we infer significant government losses on
early annuity sales, in spite of the 2% loading over the Northampton tables.
Ironically, the 1829 price increase appears to have coincided with a boom
in “speculation,” thanks to a contemporaneous decision to increase the max-
imum yield to age 90. Because of the age 75 yield cap on early annuities, the
old-age mortality experience underlying Finlaison’s tables (hence new annu-
ity prices) was primarily that of young nominees who subsequently grew old.
John Francis (1853) relates a number of amusing anecdotes about speculators
who, realizing that this would tend to cause Finlaison’s tables to overstate
the mortality of newly selected older lives, profitably combed the countryside
for “hale and hardy” old men to nominate for annuities.4
To address this speculation, an 1834 law reduced the maximum yield to
age 80 and effectively eliminated speculative purchases above age 65 (Mur-
phy, 1939); speculation was then banned outright in 1852 (Cohen, 1953). The
market for self-nominees continued, with periodic revisions to the life tables,
until its dissolution under Parliament’s 1962 Finance Act. Murphy (1939)
suggests that these revisions prevented the government from experiencing
significant losses after 1852—perhaps in part because private companies en-
tered the market offering better pricing.5
3He also studied nominees of several earlier, smaller, life-contingent debt issues.
4Among these are tales of speculators paying surgeons and clergymen to maintain the
health of the nominees—a rare case of moral hazard in annuity markets.
5See Parliamentary Papers (1808), Hendriks (1856), Murphy (1939), and The Insurance
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3 Data
Data are available from two Parliament-commissioned reports examining the
profitability of the annuities sold under the 1808 Act. The first is John
Finlaison’s 1829 report, which contains data on annuities sold between 1808
and 1826. The second is his son Alexander Glen Finlaison’s 1860 report,
which examines annuities sold between 1808 and 1850.
John Finlaison’s 1829 report contains one data set for each gender. Each
set consists of three columns of data. The first column is a list of the number
of annuities sold between 1808 and 1826 at each nominee age. The second
column lists the number of nominee deaths (between 1808 and January, 1826)
at each age. The final column lists the ages of all “censored” nominees—
i.e., those still living in January, 1826. We do not have individual level
observations. Rather, all we observe are three distributions: an aggregate
entry age distribution, an aggregate death age distribution, and an aggregate
age-at-censoring distribution for the censored individuals.
The 1860 report has a similar format. It contains five distinct three-
column data classes. The first three describe three distinct classes of “the
nominees of those parties who speculated in life annuities” (A. G. Finlai-
son, 1860, p. 14), henceforth speculative nominees. All of these speculative
nominees were males, and all were nominated after 1829. The first specula-
tive data set contains 353 nominees aged 59 to 64. The second contains 288
nominees aged 73-84. The third contains 34 nominees aged 85-92.
The final two data classes in A. G. Finlaison’s report contain information
on all male and female nominees from 1808 to the end of 1850, excluding
the aforementioned speculative nominees, but including all nominees in John
Finlaison’s data. We refer to these nominee classes as “non-speculative” (but
it is important to note that they may include speculative nominees from
the 1808 and 1829 period as well as any post-1829 speculator-nominated
annuitants that the government failed to identify as such).
The first data column in each of the five classes in the 1860 report lists
the number of nominees at each age in that class. For the non-speculative
males and females and the youngest speculative class, the second column lists
the number of deaths, by age, for nominees who had died by May 8, 1854.
For the two older speculative classes, it also includes deaths between May
8, 1854 and June 10, 1856. The third column lists the number—by age on
Institute of London (1969) for additional historical details.
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Table 1: Complete Age 59-64 Speculative Nominee Data Set
Number Number Number Number Number Number
Age Nominated∗ Dead† Living‡ Age Nominated∗ Dead† Living‡
59 7 0 0 68 0 9 36
60 50 0 4 69 0 5 43
61 61 1 13 70 0 3 42
62 91 3 25 71 0 1 22
63 81 3 17 72 0 1 4
64 63 7 17 73 0 0 7
65 0 8 2 74 0 0 9
66 0 6 16 75 0 0 4
67 0 8 34 76 0 0 3
*Between 1829 and 1850. †By May 8, 1854. ‡Nominees still living on May 8, 1854,
by age on Dec 31, 1850. Source: A. G. Finlaison (1860).
December 31, 1850—of nominees still alive on May 8, 1854 (June 10, 1856
for the two older speculative classes).
For illustrative purposes, Table 1 presents the entire data set for the
youngest class of speculative nominees. The rest of the data are in a similar
form; we omit them to save space.
Table 2 summarizes the data from the two reports. Of the 6892 annuities
purchased between 1808 and January 1, 1826, we see that approximately
30% were male; 71% of male and 80% of female nominees were still alive on
January 1, 1826. Of the 16137 non-speculative annuities purchased between
1808 and December 31, 1850, 34% were male, and 41% of each gender’s
nominees were still living on May 8, 1854. All of the older and all but one
of the middle aged speculative nominees had died by June 10, 1856.6 Nearly
85% of the speculative nominees in the younger class were still living on May
8, 1854.
Since the 1860 non-speculative data set subsumes the 1829 data set, the
increase in the (non-selected) male nominee proportion shown in Table 2 un-
derstates the true shift (to approximately 37.5%) which occurred with the
1829 implementation of gender-specific pricing. Relatively more favorable
pricing for men thus significantly shifted purchases in their direction, provid-
ing clear evidence of selection on observables.
6He died at the age of 102 in March, 1857 (A. G. Finlaison, 1860, page 88).
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Table 2: Data Summary
Gender or Nominees Nominees Dead Living
Data Set Class (#) (%) (% of Row) (% of Row)
1829 Male 2077 30.1% 28.6% 71.4%
Report Female 4815 69.9% 19.8% 80.2%
1860 Report, Male 5542 34.3% 59.3% 40.7%
Non-Speculative Female 10595 65.7% 58.9% 41.1%
1860 Report, Age 59-64 353 52.3% 15.6% 84.4%
Speculative Age 73-84 288 42.7% 99.7% 0.3%
Age 85-92 34 5.0% 100% 0%
The third (fourth) column reports the number (percent) of nominees. The fifth and
sixth data columns report the percentage of nominees with in each class who were,
respectively, dead and still-living at the time of observation (January 1, 1826 for
the 1829 report; June 10, 1856 for the age 73-84 and 85-92 classes; May 8, 1854 for
remainder of the 1860 report). Source: J. Finlaison (1829) and A. G. Finlaison (1860).
4 Empirical Analysis
Our basic empirical goal is simple: test for adverse selection by comparing the
longevities of the various classes of nominees with their expected longevity, as
predicted by an appropriate mortality table. The condensed form of the data
poses a significant challenge, however. Note, for example, that each nominee
in a given class implicitly appears twice: his age at nomination is recorded,
and either his death age or his “censored” age is recorded. However, the
data do not provide any way for us to connect these two appearances. This
precludes us from using classic survival curve techniques.
We address this challenge in two ways. First, we show how the data can be
used to generate “synthetic” survival curves for a given class of nominees; we
present suggestive graphical evidence with these curves. Second, we describe
a simple formal statistical test of whether the nominees in a given class were
longer lived on average than a given mortality table would have predicted.
4.1 Graphical Evidence: Synthetic Survival Curves
The following technique can be used to estimate a mortality table for a given
nominee class.7 Let the number xt of individuals “exposed” to death at age
7John Finlaison employed a similar technique to construct his tables.
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t in a given class be defined recursively via
xt = xt−1 + et − dt−1 − lt, (1)
where et denotes the number of age t nominees in the data set (i.e., the first-
column, age t entry), dt denotes the number of nominees who died at age t
(the second column entry), lt denotes the number individuals censored at age
t (the third-column entry), and xt = 0 for t less than the age of the youngest




We use this technique to generate five estimated mortality tables: one
each for the 1808-1826 male and female nominees, one each for the 1808-1850
male and female nominees, and one for a data set which pools all three classes
of speculative nominees. We then use these mortality tables to generate
“synthetic” survival curves.9
Figure 1 plots four survival curves for age 45 females. The lowest curve
plots the cumulative survival probability to age t, conditional on reaching age
45, for an individual whose age t mortality hazard is given by the Northamp-
ton table. The other three curves are analogous, but they instead assume
mortality hazards given by the Finlaison (female) life table, and by life ta-
bles estimated using the above method with the 1808-1826 and 1808-1850
female nominee data sets. All three are approximately coincident and lie
well above the Northampton survival curve. The 1808-1826 and 1808-1850
nominees thus appear to have had similar longevities, well above that of the
8This calculation implicitly assumes that individuals censored at age t were not exposed
at age t. The results are similar if we instead assume that individuals censored at age t were
fully exposed at age t. The “true” exposure—which we cannot observe given our data—
lies somewhere in between. We report only the present calculation since it overstates
the estimated mortality rate and biases our graphical evidence away from demonstrating
selection. An additional source of bias in the same direction stems from the fact that in
the 1808-1850 data set the third column is the age on December 31, 1850 of all individuals
who were still living as of May 8, 1854; we only partially incorporate this by aging the
third column 3 years (i.e., we ignore the extra 5 months).
9It would be preferable to focus on the 1826-1850 nominees instead of the entire 1808-
1850 nominees. We focus on the latter for two reasons. First, we cannot independently
extract the mortality and censoring history of the later nominees from our data. For
example, we can construct an age distribution of “late-dying” nominees by subtracting the
second columns of the 1808-1826 data sets from the second columns of the 1808-1850 data
sets. But this distribution combines deaths of post-1826 nominees with deaths of censored
1808-1826 nominees, and we cannot disentangle the two. Second, for related reasons, the
formal statistical test we develop below focuses on the entire 1808-1850 nominee set, and
it is useful to present graphical evidence which parallels this formal analysis.
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Figure 1: Female synthetic survival curves.
Northampton table and reasonably well approximated by Finlaison’s table.
In light of the comment in footnote 9, there is, if anything, mild evidence that
the 1808-1850 female nominees were modestly longer lived than Finlaison’s
table would have predicted.
Figure 2 plots analogous curves for males. It includes a fifth survival curve
based on the mortality table derived using the pooled speculative nominee
data. It also plots the cumulative survival probabilities from age 59—the
age of the youngest speculative nominees—rather than from age 45. Sev-
eral features are striking. First, the 1808-1826 non-speculative nominees
appear to have been longer lived than the Northampton table would have
predicted. Second, the cumulative survival probabilities derived from the
1808-1826 nominee table and the Finlaison table do not perfectly coincide,10
10This is likely for two reasons. Finlaison included in his calculations the mortality
9
Figure 2: Male synthetic survival curves.
but they reflect roughly comparable longevities. Third, the 1808-1850 nom-
inees appear to have been longer lived than the 1808-1826 nominees (and
Finlaison’s table). Finally, the speculative nominees were the longest lived
class, apparently by a wide margin.
In summary, the graphical evidence suggests that early female nominees
were selected relative to the Northampton table, while the later female nom-
inees were, if anything, only mildly selected relative to Finlaison’s table and
the early nominees. Early male nominees were clearly selected relative to
the Northampton table, and later male nominees were significantly selected
relative to the early nominees and Finlaison’s table. Finally, the speculative
nominees were strongly selected relative to everyone else. These qualitative
experiences of the nominees from earlier life-contingent debt issues in Britain and Ireland,
and he seems to have done some “smoothing” across several ages in developing his table.
10
conclusions are all borne out by the formal statistical test we now develop.
4.2 A Formal Statistical Test
Toward developing a formal statistical test for selection using our data, we
first describe a simple statistical test that applies when we know the death
ages of all nominees. We then show how to extend it to account for censoring.
Take as given a population mortality table −→q = (q0, q1, q2, · · · , q109, q110),
where qt denotes the age-t mortality hazard, and where we assume that
nobody survives beyond age 110. View the first column of data from each
nominee class as a known vector −→e = (e0, e1, · · · , e109, e110), where et is the
number of age t nominees. Let d denote the realized value of the (random)
average death age of the nominees. If −→q correctly captures the mortality of
the nominees −→e , then the test statistic
Z =
d− E [d|−→e ,−→q ]√
V
[
d|−→e ,−→q ] , (2)
has an asymptotic standard normal distribution, where E
[
d|−→e ,−→q ] and
V
[
d|−→e ,−→q ] are, respectively, the expected value and the variance of d (given−→q and the observed −→e ). High Z scores are then evidence of a nominee pool
that is adversely selected relative to −→q .
For data sets with censoring, the realized value of d is unknown, and
Equation (2) cannot be used. Towards developing an analogous test which
applies with censoring, consider Figure 3, which illustrates how we implement
the statistical test based on Equation (2) for the oldest class of speculative
nominees and with −→q given by Finlaison’s table. It shows three distrib-
utions: the age distribution of the nominees; the distribution of the final
death ages of these nominees (which are fully known for this class); and the
death age distribution that would be expected if the nominees aged according
to Finlaison’s tables. The last of these is computed by averaging over a large
number—8000, in practice—of simulated death age distributions. Each of
these 8000 trials is generated by using Finlaison’s tables to randomly draw
a final death age for each nominee.
Equation (2) is simply a test of whether the actual distribution of death
ages has a statistically significantly higher mean than the expected death age
distribution. For the oldest speculative nominees, it simply tests formally
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Figure 3: Expected and actual death age distributions for the oldest class of speculator
nominated annuitants.
whether the mean of the actual death age distribution in Figure 3 is right-
shifted relative to the mean of the expected death age distribution. We
estimate the variance of the latter (for the denominator in Equation (2))
with variance of the average death ages generated in the 8000 trials.
Figure 4 contains an analogous plot for the youngest class of speculative
nominees—most of whom are censored. It depicts two distributions. The
first, labeled “Unconditionally Expected Death Age Distribution” is the exact
analog of the “Expected Death Age Distribution” in Figure 3. It is an average
of 8000 simulated death age distribution trials, each of which uses Finlaison’s
tables to randomly draw a final death age for each nominee.
We do not observe the final death age distribution of the youngest spec-
ulative nominees, so there is no exact analog of Figure 3’s “Actual Death
Age Distribution” in Figure 4. Instead, we observe the death age distribu-
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tion of the non-censored nominees, and the age-at-censoring distribution of
the others. We use these two distributions to generate the “Conditionally
Expected Death Age Distribution” in Figure 4. This is the death age distri-
bution one would expect when given the list of the censored ages and a list of
the ages of the already-dead individuals, under the assumption that the cen-
sored individuals would subsequently age according to Finlaison’s table. We
compute this distribution by again averaging over 8000 simulated death age
distribution trials. In each trial, we first use Finlaison’s table to randomly
draw a final death age for each censored individual, and we then add the
resulting distribution of censored-individual death ages to the known death
age distribution of the non-censored individuals.
Our test for selection in the presence of censoring, formalized in Equation
(3) below, is a test of whether the mean of the conditionally expected death
age distribution (E[d|−→l ,−−−→dearly,−→q ]) is higher than the mean of the uncondi-
tionally expected death age distribution (E[d|−→e ,−→q ]). In other words, is the
former distribution right shifted relative to the latter, as it appears to be in
Figure 4 for the youngest speculative nominee class?
A formal test requires deriving an estimate of the asymptotic variance of
the difference between the unconditional and conditional mean death ages.
This is more difficult than in the no-censoring case, since the conditional
mean death age and the unconditional mean death age are not independent
variables. In the Appendix, we show that the appropriate variance to use is
simply the difference in the variances of the conditional and unconditional
mean death ages. Formally, we show that:
Z ′ =
E[d|−→l ,−−−→dearly,−→q ]− E[d|−→e ,−→q ]√
V [d|−→e ,−→q ]− V [d|−→l ,−−−→dearly,−→q ]
(3)
has an asymptotic standard normal distribution (under the hypothesis that
the mortality of the nominees is correctly described by mortality table −→q ).
Z ′ thus serves as the basis for our formal statistical test for selection among
classes with censoring.11
A high Z ′ provides evidence of an adversely selected set of nominees.
Note, however, that the numerator in Equation (3) likely underestimates
the degree of adverse selection since E[d|−→l ,−−−→dearly,−→q ] is computed under the
11We again use the 8000 trials to estimate V [d|−→e ,−→q ] and V [d|−→l ,−−−→dearly,−→q ].
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Figure 4: Unconditionally and conditionally expected death age distributions for the
youngest class of speculator nominated annuitants.
assumption that the censored individuals subsequently aged according to the
non-selected mortality table.
5 Results
We first present the basic results of tests based on Equations (2) and (3).
These tests confirm the selection patterns suggested by Figures 1 and 2. We
then briefly discuss and dismiss two potential caveats: the possible inappro-
priateness of Northampton table as a population mortality table, and the
potentially confounding effects of time trends. Finally, we quantify the size
of the selection effects among the various classes.
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Table 3: Testing for Adverse Selection,
Northampton Tables
E(d¯) σˆ Z ′
Unconditional Conditional
Males, 1826 72.34 72.97 0.126 5.02
Females, 1826 71.31 72.84 0.082 18.72
E(d¯) refers to the expected average nominee death age of all nominees. Column
“Unconditional” (“Conditional”) reports the unconditional expected average death
age (the expected average death age conditional on the observed mortality history
through 1826). Column σˆ is the estimated standard error of the difference between
these two columns. Z ′ is the Z-score of the difference (viz Equation (3)).
5.1 Basic Statistical Results
Table 3 uses Equation (3) to test the appropriateness of the Northampton
tables for the male and female nominees in the 1829 data set. It indicates
that the early nominees of both genders were conditionally predicted to live
significantly longer than they were unconditionally predicted to live, with
males and females conditionally estimated to live an average of .63 (i.e.,
72.97− 72.34) and 1.53 years longer, respectively. As discussed above, these
differences likely understate the degree of selection.
Table 4 uses Equations (2) and (3) to test the appropriateness of Fin-
laison’s tables for each of the seven nominee classes. The final two rows
indicate that Finlaison’s life tables were appropriate for the 1808-1826 nomi-
nees: the conditionally and unconditionally expected average death ages are
statistically identical for both males and females.
The first two rows of Table 4 indicate that for the 1808-1850 non-speculative
nominees, the conditionally predicted longevity exceeds the unconditionally
predicted longevity by 0.84 and 0.22 years for males and females, respectively.
Both are statistically significant at standard levels.12
Finally, the middle 3 rows of Table 4 indicate that all three speculative
nominee classes had significantly greater longevity than Finlaison’s tables
predicted.
12The pre-1826 nominees are a subset of these nominees. Hence, this is a pure test
for additional selection amongst post-1826 nominees only insofar as the Finlaison tables
accurately describe the mortality of early nominees.
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Table 4: Testing for Adverse Selection, Finlaison Tables
E(d¯) σˆ Z, Z ′
Unconditional Conditional
NS Males, 1850 73.79 74.63 0.126 7.81
NS Females, 1850 76.23 76.45 0.087 2.56
S Males, 59-64 74.84 77.72 0.320 9.01
S Males, 73-84 83.40 84.72 0.230 5.10
S Males, 85+ 89.88 91.62 0.329 5.28
Males, 1826 73.87 73.87 0.123 −0.05
Females, 1826 76.12 76.11 0.086 −0.17
“NS” and “S” refer to non-speculative and speculative classes, respectively. E(d¯)
refers to the expected average death age of all nominees. Column “Unconditional”
(“Conditional”) reports the unconditional expected average death age (expected av-
erage death age conditional on the observed mortality history through 1854, 1856,
or 1826 for the first four rows, the fifth row, and the final two rows, respectively).
Column σˆ is the estimated standard error of the difference between the two death
age estimates. Z,Z ′ is the Z-score of the difference between the conditional and
unconditional average death ages (viz Equations (2) and (3)).
5.2 Selection Among 1808-1826 Nominees
Under the 1808 Act, Parliament priced annuities under the assumption that
the Northampton tables described the mortality of the British population.
The results in Table 3 indicate either that there was significant selection
amongst the early nominees or that Parliament’s assumption was incorrect.
The Northampton table was based on the mortality history of residents
in a single town, and it was developed from observations in the mid 1700s,
so its appropriateness as a measure of population-average mortality in the
early 1800s is clearly suspect. Unfortunately, reliable data on mortality rates
prior to 1838—when the British Government began systematically record-
ing all births and deaths—are lacking (McKeown and Record, 1962). The
earliest reliable population mortality table, known as the English Life Ta-
ble 3 (ELT3), was developed by William Farr using data collected between
1838 and 1853 (Farr, 1864). Table 5 compares the magnitudes of the se-
lection effects relative to the Northampton, Finlaison, and ELT3 tables. It
indicates significant selection effects among early nominees even relative to
ELT3 (albeit more modest ones than relative to the Northampton table).
This suggests that, while the Northampton tables may have been inappro-
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Table 5: Comparing Selection Effects Across Life Tables
Excess Years Lived (Z-score)
Class Northampton Finlaison ELT3
Males, 1826 0.63 (5.0 ) 0.00 (0.0 ) 0.35 (2.9 )
Females, 1826 1.53 (18.7 ) -0.01 (-0.2 ) 0.91 (11.6 )
NS Males, 1850 2.24 (20.9 ) 0.84 (7.8 ) 2.00 (14.4 )
NS Females, 1850 3.90 (46.9 ) 0.22 (2.6 ) 2.51 (30.2 )
This table reports the difference between the conditional and unconditional expected
number of years lived for three life tables (the Northampton, Finlaison, and English
Life Table 3 described in the text) and four nominee classes. Parentheses denote
Z-scores (viz Equation (3)).
priate, selection effects were nevertheless important.
5.3 Self-Selection Among Subsequent Nominees
Table 4 indicates that the Finlaison tables did a good job capturing the mor-
tality of the early nominees but overstated the mortality of the late nominees.
To interpret this as evidence of additional selection subsequent to the 1829
re-pricing, we need to rule out a time trend in mortality rates. The lack
of reliable data prior to 1838 prevents us from doing so fully definitively,
but time trends seems likely to have been of negligible importance over our
period of study.
Wrigley and Schofield (1981, pages 230 ff) indicate that life expectancy
at birth exhibited a mild upward trend between 1800 and 1850, but Green-
wood (1936), examining post-1841 data, suggests that this trend was driven
exclusively by early-life mortality, stating:
When the historical sequence is examined... [O]ne could hardly
say that the rate at 35-45 had moved decisively before the early
eighties, or that at ages 45-55 until the turn of the century. In
old age, improvement is now barely perceptible. (Page 678.)
The post-1841 age-specific mortality trends plotted in McKeown and
Record (1962) strongly support Greenwood’s claims and give us confidence
that the increased longevity of the later nominees is primarily attributable
to additional selection.
This pattern—selection, repricing, and then additional selection—is rem-
iniscent of the first stages of an Akerlovian death spiral (as found by Cutler
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and Reber (1998) but not Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002) in health insur-
ance contexts). The spiral was clearly incomplete in 1850—additional rounds
of re-pricing and market thinning were needed—and the lack of data going
forward prevents us from definitively determining whether or not the market
would have completely unraveled. However, the magnitudes of the shift in
market size and longevity among females suggest that the market would not
have been eviscerated by a death spiral. Indeed, the average annual sales to
female nominees fell quite modestly (by about 10%) in response to the sub-
stantial (approximately 17%) 1829 re-pricing, and the later nominees were
only modestly longer-lived than the early nominees. A back-of-the-envelope
extrapolation of the demand and pricing responses from the first round of
re-pricing suggests that all further rounds of the spiral would have thinned
the market by only an additional 5 to 20%.13,14
5.4 Comparing the Degrees of Selection
Table 4 shows that the speculative and the non-speculative nominees from
A. G. Finlaison’s data set both displayed higher longevity than Finlaison’s
table predicted. Figures 1 and 2 qualitatively suggest that the speculative
nominees were significantly longer-lived than the non-speculative nominees.
To affirm this, we compute “longevity enhancement factors” (LEFs), which
quantify the degree of selection, for each nominee class. LEF is defined as:
LEF =
Actual average death age− Expected average death age
Expected average death age − Average nomination age, (4)
i.e., the percent by which average longevity exceeded predicted longevity.
A direct computation of a LEF is impossible when there is censoring, so
we instead compute upper and lower bounds. Our lower bound assumes that
the still-living nominees subsequently aged according to Finlaison’s tables.
13The lower end is based on the 10% per-annum quantity response by females (Table 2)
to the 17% re-pricing, and the roughly 4% longevity increase of the later nominees (using
Table 6, below, and the fact that about half of the nominees in the later data set were
“unselected” early nominees). The upper end is based on a similar calculation instead
using a “differences in differences” approach relative to males.
14Murphy (1939) indicates that the market stabilized and gradually shrunk after spec-
ulation was banned in 1852. One must interpret this cautiously, however (and not only
because we lack data): by the late 1800s, the confounding effects of improving mortality
trends begin to bite, and, furthermore, private-sector annuities became viable alternatives.
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Table 6: Estimated Longevity Enhancements
Class Lower Bound LEF Upper Bound LEF
Non-Speculative Males, 1850 5.65% 9.06%
Non-Speculative Females, 1850 1.17% 1.80%
Speculative Males, 59-64 22.56% 121.91%
Exact LEF
Speculative Males, 73-84 25.37%
Speculative Males, 85+ 94.02%
Estimated “longevity enhancement factors” (LEF): the percentage by which the
longevity of a given group of nominees exceeded the longevity predicted by Finlaison’s
mortality tables.
Our upper bound assumes instead that the still-living nominees had equal
enhancement factors prior to and subsequent to censoring.15
Table 6 reports our calculations. We see that the longevity of the spec-
ulative classes was substantially more enhanced than the longevity of the
non-speculative classes. The non-speculative males are estimated to have
lived between 5.65% and 9.06% longer than the Finlaison tables predicted.
In contrast, the selected groups are estimated to have lived at least 20% and
up to 122.91% longer. The non-speculative females appear even less selected
than the males: their LEF is between 1.17% and 1.80%.16 These estimates
are fully consistent with the graphical evidence in Figures 1 and 2.
15Formally, the upper bound LEF solves:
NT ·(AN+(E[AF ]−AN )(1+LEF )) = ND ·AD+NL·(AL+(E[ALD|~l]−AL)(1+LEF )), (5)
where: NT , ND, and NL are the number of nominees, the number of nominees who had
died by the time of observation, and the number of living nominees, respectively; AN , AD,
and AL are the average ages of the nominees, the dead, and the “censored”, respectively;
and E[AF ] and E[ALD|~l] are the expected average death age of the nominees and the
expected average death age of the censored observations.
16The relative enhancements of the non-selected males and the non-selected females may
stem from the combination of gender-blind early pricing and the fact that the pre-1828
data upon which the Finlaison tables were based did not distinguish between “speculative”
and “non-speculative” nominees. The most profitable nominees under the pre-1829 pricing
were the longer-lived females. Insofar as speculators in the pre-1829 period were aware of
this, Finlaison’s female life table is based on the mortality experience of a highly selected
nominee pool.
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6 Discussion and Conclusions
Our analysis indicates that the market created by the U.K.’s 1808 Life An-
nuity Act was characterized by two types of adverse selection. The market
displayed classic “self-selection,” whereby annuitants purchasing annuities
for themselves were longer lived than the average individual in the popu-
lation. It also displayed “speculative selection,” whereby pecuniary-minded
individuals and institutions took advantage of an odd feature of the act and
purchased annuities contingent on the lives of others.
The substantially stronger selection effects for speculator-nominated an-
nuitants has important policy implications: it suggests particular caution
when expanding “choice” in government provided services insofar as those
choices can be made or influenced by individuals or institutions with primar-
ily pecuniary motives.
The relative strength of speculative selection also has important impli-
cations for empirical research on insurance markets. In contrast to self-
nominees, speculator nominated annuitants are unlikely to have been advan-
tageously selected. The evidence for adverse selection among these nominees
is therefore particularly compelling, relative to previous studies. Further-
more, the relative magnitudes of measured selection among speculative and
non-speculative nominees—among whom advantageous selection was poten-
tially problematic—lends credence to the view that advantageous selection
may have substantial confounding effects in standard insurance markets.
This is important for interpreting the underwhelming evidence of adverse
selection in previous studies of contemporary insurance markets as well as
for designing appropriate empirical approaches in future research.
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7 Appendix
This appendix shows that the test statistic Z ′, defined in Equation (3), has an asymptotic
standard normal distribution.
Fix a mortality table −→q (suppressed for notational convenience henceforth). Then,
fixing a class of nominees (e.g., pre 1829 males), view the random process underlying the
data as a three-step compound process: (i) process α draws an independent random age
and nomination year for each nominee j = 1, · · · , N from some fixed distribution; (ii)
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process β draws an independent random lifetime up to the censoring date for j (using
mortality table −→q ); and (iii) random process γ draws an independent random lifetime
beyond the censoring time for censored individuals. Note that our observations take place
after processes α and β (and before γ), but that we observe only aggregates associated
with these processes.
Let mj denote the (random) death age of j. Define b(αj , βj) = Eγ [mj |αj , βj ] and














Since b(αj , βj)− a(αj), j = 1, · · · , N are i.i.d. random variables, we drop the subscript j
and note that:




l ]− E[d¯|−→e ]√
Vα,β [b(α, β)− a(α)] /N
(7)
has an asymptotic standard normal distribution by the Central Limit Theorem.







Vγ [m|α, β] + (Eγ [m|α, β])2
]
− (Eα,β [Eγ [m|α, β]])2




− (Eα,β [b(α, β)])2
=Eα,β [Vγ [m|α, β]] + Vα,β [b(α, β)],
(8)
where we have used the law of iterated expectations, and where we explicitly subscript the
variance terms with the random process(es) causing the variation. Similar logic yields:
Vα,β,γ [m] = Eα [Vβ,γ [m|α]] + Vα[a(α)]. (9)
Since Covα,β [b(α, β), a(α)] = Vα[a(α)], we also have:
Vα,β [b(α, β)− a(α)]=Vα,β [b(α, β)]− Vα[a(α)]
=Eα [Vβ,γ [m|α]]− Eα,β [Vγ [m|α, β]] , (10)
where the last equality uses Equations (8) and (9).
To complete our derivation, observe that
















Vγ [mj |αj , βj ]→p Eα,β [Vγ [m|α, β]] .
The asymptotic standard normality of Z ′ in Equation (3) follows directly from these
observations and Equations (7) and (10).
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